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Western coverage of Russian journalism often bemoans the current state of Russian independent 
media: shrinking every year, with an increasing number of websites, journals, and newspapers 
either forced to close following legal action or purchased by state-affiliated media companies. 
When Russian journalists appear in Western publications, it is often because of their murder of 
beating and the intense scrutiny that it receives from outside of Russia. While Russia is 
understood to be enormously dangerous for independent, critical journalists to operate in 
according to several journalism watchdogs, Russian independent media carries on, and remains a 
significant force in Russian civil society. Given the continued existence of independent Russian 
journalism, and its willingness to investigate the Russian state, why do certain members of the 
Russian media become targets of violence? This paper, through a case study approach, contends 
that, while no absolute cause can be identified all the time, journalists who attack the Russian 
state building project since Vladimir V Putin’s election to the Presidency in 2000 are at a greater 









  CASE SELECTION………………………………………………………………6 
CHAPTER 1: THE RUSSIAN MEDIA LANDSCAPE…………………………………………..9 
CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTS OF STATE BUILDING……………………………………………16 
 STATE BUILDING IN RUSSIA………………………………………………………..17 
CHAPTER 3: CASES……………………………………………………………………………21 
 CASE 1: ANNA POLITKOVSKAYA…………………………………………………..21 
 CASE 2: YURI SHCHEKOCHIKHIN………………...………………………………..28 
 CASE 3: MAXIM BORODIN…………………………………………………………...33 
 CASE 4: NIKOLAI ANDRUSHCHENKO……………………………………………..39 
 CASE 5: DMITRY POPKOV…………………………..………………….……………42 








 In March 2018 Vladimir V Putin was re-elected as President of the Russian Federation 
for a fourth term, which will see him remain the leader of the largest country on earth until at 
least 2024. Should he leave office when this term ends, he will have changed the Russian state 
dramatically from the beginning of his first term to the end of his last, transforming it from the 
relative competitiveness of the early 2000s to the consolidated competitive-authoritarian system 
that it is today and will likely continue to be for the immediate future. An element of this 
transformation has been a significant series of changes in the relationship between the Russian 
state and the Russian media, and with it, an exceptional amount of violence against Russian 
journalists that has resulted in the deaths of dozens. The Committee to Protect Journalists, an 
independent watchdog that monitors global press freedom, has investigated 58 murders of 
journalists since the beginning of data collection in 1992; they also rank Russia 11th on their 
Global Impunity Index, which ranks countries by how frequently the murders of journalists go 
un-investigated.1 A second watchdog, Reporters Without Borders, ranks Russian press freedom 
148th out of 180 countries studied in their annual report on global freedom of the press,2 and 
global civil and political liberties watchdog Freedom House rates Russian press as “not free,” 
                                                 
1 Committee to Protect Journalists. 31 August 2018. “Getting Away with Murder.” CPJ Reports. 
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indicating significantly restrictive legal, political, and economic environments for press 
operation.3  
 In this paper, I will seek to explain the phenomenon of Russian journalist murder, 
specifically since the beginning of Putin’s Presidency in 1999. In many developed, consolidated 
democracies such as the United States and many European Union states, political violence is 
relatively rare and largely considered an aberration, or an abnormal condition in an otherwise 
“healthy” and functional state. I feel it necessary, given the preponderance of examples of the 
usage of violence in the political sphere in Russia, to attempt to explain why so many media 
figures meet such violent ends, especially in light of a key factor: the continued existence of 
legitimate oppositional media activity in the country. Some figures are able to avoid such attacks 
entirely, which indicates at least partial tolerance on the part of the government for opposition 
media. Why do certain figures in media become victims of violence in Putin’s Russia, while 
others are able to avoid it? 
Argument 
 Key to understanding the violence that at present threatens Russian independent media is 
to understand the development of Russian media since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Elena 
Vartanova’s theory of the media-state relationship in Russia since the early 2000s contributes 
heavily to my understanding of how the Russian media operates. Vartanova plots the 
development of Russian media since the ending of official censorship in 1991 to the 
contemporary, state-dominated system, and describes three principle periods of post-Soviet 
media development. These are the initial period, from 1991 to 1994, in which media emerged 
                                                 





from the Soviet censorship system and responded with a rush to uncover and report on Soviet 
atrocities. This was followed by a period of business consolidation, where capital holders who 
had emerged from the Soviet period with great wealth began creating media conglomerates, such 
as NTV and Channel One. Following this, and beginning with Vladimir Putin’s first term as 
President from 2000 to 2004, began the current period of re-consolidation and the re-entrance of 
the state into the media environment. Vartanova claims that the administration’s primary goal 
since 2000 has been to re-assert a significant level of control in Russian media, in contrast to the 
relatively independent environment of the early 1990s and the business-dominated environment 
of the latter half of that decade. The primary target for this consolidation has been electronic 
media (predominantly television), of which 70% came under state ownership at the beginning of 
the 2000s, but similar efforts have been made in regional and local presses.4 Especially as the 
share of actually consumed media in Russia tips further and further towards electronic media, 
this has allowed the state to set the agenda for written journalism since the early 2000s, 
establishing a tight formal control over at least 20% of national press and an informal control 
over a much larger share as well, for reasons such as advertising dependence and “soft” coercion 
that will be detailed later in this paper.5 
 Vartanova establishes a theory of the current administration’s goal for the media in 
general since Putin’s victory in the 2000 presidential election. Under the Putin administration, 
the media is tasked with: 
1. Supporting the vertical power system 
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2. Creating a unified national identity 
3. Minimizing politically incorrect debate6 
Vartanova describes this period as characterized by the emergence of “Putin’s ‘monocentric’ 
political regime,” primarily aimed at “the improvement of political management and a decrease 
in internal conflicts,” such as the Chechen Wars, urban terrorism, and even clashes between rural 
and urban centers.7 I identify all three of these media goals as supporting increased Russian state 
capacity. 
 My argument hinges on this concept: that since taking office in 2000, Vladimir Putin and 
his administration have sought to transform Russian media into primarily a state-building 
apparatus; one that actively works to reinforce government efforts to increase state capacity as 
Russia continues to develop its state following the difficult period of the 1990s. It is evident that 
the majority of Russian media outlets have bought into this plan: as mentioned before, the state 
directly controls about 80% of the television market through its ownership of large channels such 
as Channel One and Rossiya, as well as NTV, now owned by state-owned oil company 
Gazprom.8 As I will seek to demonstrate in this paper, a subset of journalists operate outside of 
two umbrellas: that of direct state ownership (and therefore censorship), and that of state 
approval, specifically state approval of the state-building utility of their reporting. When 
journalists write articles and other pieces that interfere with the government’s attempts to 
increase the capacity of the Russian state, they become potential targets of violence. 
                                                 
6 Vartanova, Elena. 2012. “The Russian Media Model in the Context of Post-Soviet Dynamics.” in 
Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World, eds. Daniel C Hallin and Paolo Mancini. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 134. 
7 Ibid., 133. 




 This concept, however, is not absolute: I also identify an interfering factor that I believe 
significantly contributes to a journalist’s likelihood of becoming a victim of violence. My 
research suggests that journalists who also work in an official capacity, particularly in 
government, in addition to their media duties, are more likely to be attacked at some point in 
their careers. I believe this is due to the increased visibility, whether local or national, that comes 
with working in or with the government. 
 Furthermore, my research has not been able to establish a consistent “formula” for 
predicting acts of violence against journalists. These attacks, and the impunity that tends to 
follow them, are difficult to predict and are seemingly random; the goal of this paper will be to 
identify similarities in the cases that I present. Multiple other examples of journalists exist who 
attack the Russian state building project and are not murdered; however, I identify that this sort 
of attack is common among all journalists studied who are. I also do not set out to claim that the 
Russian federal authorities, Dmitry Medvedev, or Vladimir Putin themselves are “behind” these 
attacks or plan them methodically. What binds these examples of violence together are the 
impunity from prosecution that the perpetrators and planners receive, and I identify this as the 
state’s most clear involvement in the deaths. While it is impossible to identify perpetrators as a 
researcher, it is possible to identify incidents in which killers and so-called masterminds do not 
suffer consequences from the government. 
Methodology 
 To present my data and argument for this paper, I use a descriptive case study approach. I 
have chosen this method due to the relatively low number of cases that would be covered in a 
quantitative study, making such a study difficult to conduct. In total since 1992, 58 cases of 




that quantitative analysis would yield few results. Case studies also allow this study to go in-
depth into the personal and professional histories of these journalists, providing better insight 
into their reportage and other writing. For each case study I will 
1. Provide a brief biography of the journalist in question, including their work outside of 
journalism, especially as a part of or in conjunction with the government 
2. Describe his or her work in the years leading up to the violent attempt on their life 
3. Explain the ways in which this journalist could be considered to have operated outside from 
the “state-building” model of the media. 
Case Selection 
 I have selected cases for this study first by assembling a table of journalists killed in 
Russia since 1999, using data from Committee to Protect Journalists and Reporters Without 
Borders, two organizations that catalogue incidents of violence against journalists.9 Both of these 
organizations archive all deaths of journalists in Russia and other countries, but differentiate 
between causes of death; specifically, they indicate if researchers and colleagues have reason to 
believe that the journalists in question were killed because of their work. In my first selection I 
eliminated all journalists from my study that were killed in crossfire incidents in open conflicts 
such as Chechnya. Next, taking into consideration the situation in Chechnya since the outbreak 
of war there in 1994, I removed cases from my study in which the journalists in question were 
almost certainly victims of extremist violence by Chechen resistance groups. I consider these 
cases to be completely outside of the control of the state, and therefore not relevant to my study 
of violence against journalists in Russia. 
                                                 




 Following this selection, my list of journalists has been narrowed down to eighteen. I 
have further constricted this by selecting three cases from each of Vladimir Putin’s non-
consecutive two-term blocks as President in order to give a more complete picture of conditions 
for journalists inside of the ever-changing Putin administration.10 Due to the relatively low 
number of cases, I have selected the six which I believe best fit my study and support my 
argument, while providing a complete and accurate picture of the dangers that are faced by 
journalists in Russia. These cases are listed in the table below, and number six in total that I will 
detail later in this paper. Further analysis of these cases supports my primary argument: the 
journalists who have been killed under Putin have been concerned with high-level state capacity 
issues, such as FSB operations, independence movements in Chechnya, and the presidency itself. 
In the next section of this paper, I explain this argument further, as well as its implications. 
 It is also important to note that this paper does not aim to establish guilt or culpability in 
any of the following cases. Although a strong case can be made in some of these examples for 
direct state violence being responsible for the deaths of the journalists in question, what connects 
these cases for the purpose of this paper are the impunity that killers or planners receive 
following the deaths of their targets. While this paper is also intentional in its avoidance of 
blaming Putin specifically for anti-journalist violence, these examples of impunity have 




                                                 
10 For the second block (2012-2024) these cases trend towards the last two years, as there was a gap of 4 




Table 1.1: Cases, by year 
Name Year Affiliation Scope Topics Investigation Official 
Role 
































Incomplete City council 
member 
Dmitry Popkov 2017 Ton-M Regional Corruption 
among police 
Incomplete City council 
member 








CHAPTER 1: THE RUSSIAN MEDIA LANDSCAPE 
 A useful starting point for understanding the violence that plagues some Russian media 
outlets is the recent development of journalism, television, and radio in Russia, specifically since 
independent media became widespread (and legal) in the twilight of the Soviet Union. An 
element of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms was the gradual toleration of more forms of 
media separate from totally state-run channels such as Pravda and Izvestia, and two 
opportunities arose: for journalists already working in official channels, more topics could be 
explored, including those that would have resulted in censure before the reform; and for 
journalists who worked primarily in samizdat or other underground publications, circulation of 
their material became safer. Furthermore the secretive nature of the Soviet states and the (at 
times) serious fear of imprisonment or other violence for reporting on sensitive topics resulted in 
an explosion of reporting on formerly forbidden issues such as the war in Afghanistan, prison 
conditions, and past Soviet atrocities.11 Anna Arutunyan argues in her book The Media in Russia 
that this rush to “unmask the atrocities of the Soviet regime” created “an exuberant press culture” 
for new and old journalists to participate in, and while it could hardly be considered totally 
independent, this was an early flowering of a relatively free press structure, with few barriers to 
                                                 





reporting on most topics.12 This period was brief, and concluded with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, just two days after a watershed media act was passed: the Mass Media Law, which 
formally ended government censorship of media. This act largely withdrew the state from the 
media sphere, encouraging (like in most industries in Russia at the time) privatization and the 
new introduction of a media market.13 Again as with many Russian industries, privatization in 
media was dominated by two players: Boris Berezovsky’s Channel One and Vladimir 
Gusinsky’s NTV, two news organizations that purchased dozens of smaller, independent 
television stations and newspapers in order to form oligarchic competition.14 This business 
model emerged as the first non-state model for mass media in Russia; Arutunyan classifies it as 
the second period of the 1990s for media development, with the first being the establishment of 
independent media from 1990 until 1995.15 
 The relative independence and openness of the 1990s, however, proved to be a short-
lived experience, as the election of Vladimir Putin and the beginning of single-party state 
dominance marked the beginning of a new pattern in Russian media. President Boris Yeltsin had 
attempted to bring media back under the control, or at least the influence, of the Russian state 
during his presidency, but was largely thwarted by Berezovsky, Gusinsky, and other smaller 
media patrons, owners of stations that covered the first Russian president with increasing 
negativity.16 The state attempted to exert economic pressures on independent outlets to bring 
                                                 
12 Arutunyan, Anna. 2009. The Media in Russia. New York: Open University Press. 
13 Slavtcheva-Petkova, Russia’s Liberal Media, 19. 
14 Reporters Without Borders. 2016. “Report: Media Oligarchs go Shopping.” 17. 
15 Arutunyan, The Media in Russia, 34. 





them back under the federal umbrella, but the sheer economic potential of Channel One and 
NTV’s patrons prevented this from being particularly successful.17 Following Putin’s 
appointment as acting President in 1999 and his election to the presidency in 2000, the 
government escalated their economic pressuring of independent media outlets, including smaller 
papers and radio programs, but critically began to take direct action against their financiers: 
Gusinsky was arrested in June of 2000, and Berezovsky emigrated to the United Kingdom later 
that year.18 The Ministry of Press, Broadcasting, and Mass Communication (Roscomnadzor) was 
created under Putin, with an improved ability to harass independent journalism through 
economic pressures and incentives, including “legal sanctions, libel lawsuits, political 
appointments of key media executives, [and] denial of access to information.”19 These efforts 
were enormously successful: during the early 2000s, “70% of electronic media, 80% of regional 
press, and 20% of the national press” came under state ownership.20 According to Arutunyan, the 
two principle goals of the early stage of Putin’s re-nationalization of the media were: 
1. Convincing media outlets to take on an active nation-building role 
2. De-politicizing journalism and converting electronic media to an entertainment role 
Oligarchic control of newspapers and TV channels was a clear obstacle to this, and any outlets 
who could not be co-opted and brought into the state sphere were aggressively pursued, such as 
                                                 
17 Vartanova, Elena. 2012. “The Russian Media Model in the Context of Post-Soviet Dynamics.” in 
Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World, eds. Daniel C Hallin and Paolo Mancini. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
18 Gusinsky was released from prison later in June, and in July reached an agreement to sell all media 
assets. 
19 Slavtcheva-Petkova, Russia’s Liberal Media, 24, quoting Arutunyan, The Media in Russia 





the two cases mentioned above. These efforts also worked in conjunction with the worsening 
conflict in Chechnya, as anti-extremism and anti-terror laws were deployed against publications 
covering the Chechen conflict in ways that the government deemed unacceptable. “Extremism” 
was defined vaguely in order to be deployed against a wide spectrum of unfavorable coverage: 
for example, the legal definition of extremism includes “public slander towards officials 
fulfilling state duties of the Russian Federation.”21 
 Finally, a new stage of the state-media relationship appears to be emerging following the 
Russian seizure of Crimea in 2014 and breakout of the ongoing conflict in the Donbas region of 
Ukraine. Russian media sources have agreed that journalistic independence has deteriorated 
considerably since the beginning of the conflict, as unfavorable coverage can now be linked 
more closely with unpatriotic behavior.22 Slavtcheva-Petkova claims that new restrictions on 
independent journalism are best understood as fitting into the active nation-building role of the 
press desired by the Russian state: she cites a recent trip to Moscow where she spoke with local 
journalists before the 9th of May Victory Day celebrations, where they claimed that since 2014 
the celebrations have had much more attention and fanfare.23 This restriction is in line with 
Hutchings and Rulyova’s understanding of the nation building project, as they theorize that it 
involves quite heavily Putin’s efforts “to install a latter-day version of imperial pride in Russian 
military achievements,” binding the nation together around the ideal of the Russian army.24 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 33, quoting Arutunyan 
22 Ibid., 28. 
23 Ibid., 29. 
24 Hutchings, Stephen and Natalia Rulyova. 2009. Television and Culture in Putin’s Russia: Remote 




These goals, coupled with genuine desire among Russian citizens to see positive depictions of 
the military in media, have resulted in a more state-driven and state-dependent media atmosphere 
in present-day Russia. 
Comparisons of Violence in Russia and other States 
 A useful transition from thinking about Russian journalism in general to violence against 
Russian journalists is to examine circumstances of violence for journalists in different states. In 
these comparisons we will also be able to differentiate between a repressive state and a violent 
state for journalists to operate in; while all violent states are repressive, as repression increases 
and the ability of independent journalism to operate decreases, violence also decreases. Looking 
within the former Soviet Union is a useful starting point for this, as Russia’s status as an 
interesting site for study is confirmed by its myriad examples of violence. 




















Source: Committee to Protect Journalists 
58 journalists killed since CPJ data collection began in 1992 is by 41 the highest out of any 
former Soviet republic, with Tajikistan’s 17 and Ukraine’s 12 the only other states that have had 
murders in the double-digits since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is also the highest out of 
all European states, and is comparable to Somalia (66 deaths), Mexico (48 deaths), and 
Colombia (51 deaths).25 All three of these states are considered extremely dangerous for 
journalist activity by Committee to Protect Journalists along with Russia. Committee to Protect 
Journalists, however, covers three main anti-media tactics in the states it studies: journalists 
killed, journalists imprisoned, and cases in which the killers of journalists received prosecutorial 
impunity. Reporters Without Borders, a second journalism watchdog, monitors press freedom 
more generally, including the ability of independent media to circulate publications, protection 
from financial burdens imposed by the state, and ability to establish media infrastructure, as well 
as physical threats against journalists themselves. They rank 180 countries on a scale of “world 
press freedom,” and fascinatingly none of the aforementioned countries score within the top 10 
least free countries for overall press freedom despite high levels of violence. 
Table 2.2: Number of murdered journalists, by RSF Press Freedom ranking 
RSF Ranking. Country Number of Journalists killed since 1992 
180. DPR Korea 0 
179. Eritrea 2 
178. Turkmenistan 1 
                                                 




177. Syria 139 
176. China 5 
175. Vietnam 1 
174. Sudan 2 
173. Djibouti 0 
172. Cuba.  0 
171. Equatorial Guinea 0 
 
Sources: Committee to Protect Journalists, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) 
The most significant outlier in this table is Syria, a state with an ongoing civil war. Before 2011, 
no journalists had been killed in Syria. A second useful comparison for violence against 
journalists in Russia is Russia itself; specifically, the two presidential administrations that have 
governed the country since the collapse of the Soviet Union. From 1992 to 1999 30 journalists 
were killed in Russia with motives likely related to their work, and from 2000 to 2019 28 were 
killed. Yeltsin’s administration, then, was more violent, accounting for just over half of all post-
1992 journalist murders in Russia in 8 years as opposed to the 19 of the Putin-Medvedev 
government. This is potentially understood as part of a trend of increasing state efficacy: 
Russia’s murder rate in general has fallen dramatically since the Yeltsin period, from a high of 
47,870 murders in 1994 to a current low of 7,067 in 2018.26 
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CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTS OF STATE BUILDING 
 In order to understand what threats the Russian state building project has faced from 
oppositional journalists since it began under Putin in 2000, we should investigate the idea of state 
building in general, starting by defining it. This chapter will serve to differentiate state building 
from nation building, and explain how these concepts work together in Russia. Pål Kolstø 
clarifies two different definitions of nation-building in national states; firstly an ethnic definition 
of the citizenry, in which the state adopts the legends, cultural markers, symbols, and traditions 
of the nation as one and the same, and a civic concept of citizenry, which he argues can develop 
from the creation of a civic state. One method for nation-building in post-communist Europe is 
the hybrid model of ethnic and civic citizenship, in which “the state is understood as a national 
but not a nationalizing state,” meaning that while the state is understood to have a national 
character, other national groups within the state have their rights protected especially in regard to 
language and education; that is, they will not face nationalizing forces.27 
 In this conceptualization, the state gains its legitimacy from both its national aspect and 
from its efficacy in defending minority rights and providing all citizens with equal access to state 
services. This approaches a different concept, that of state-building, which is unique from nation-
building but is not necessarily opposed to it. Indeed, when groups work to improve the condition 
of the state, they can at the same time improve the status of the nation, and vice-versa. Kolstø 
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argues in his later work Nation-Building and Common Values in Russia that “successful state-
building… is conducive to successful nation-building, for state-building and nation-building are 
not rival projects but two aspects of the same process of state consolidation.”28 He refers to this 
as “state-oriented nation-building,” and identifies this process as taking place in Russia since the 
beginning of Vladimir Putin’s presidency. 
State Building in Russia  
 Kolstø analyzes the Russian nation-building project through a value-oriented approach, 
and his examination of Russian values also contributes to an understanding of the building of the 
Russian state. He examines a document posted on Vladimir Putin’s website from 2000 which 
details the President’s plan for the new millennium if re-elected at the beginning of the year; this 
document also contains the President’s vision of the Russian people and their values. Putin 
claims “people have adopted such values as the freedom of expression, the right to leave the 
country, and other political rights and personal liberties,” which Kolstø categorizes as “values 
normally associated with Western-style… liberal democracy.”29 Putin later in the document 
details a second set of values: “primordial, traditional Russian values,” specifically patriotism, 
great-power-ism (derzhavnost’), and state-centric-ism (gosudarstvennichestvo). 
 The final point, state-centric-ism, is particularly interesting, as Kolstø found in his 2004 
study that support for state paternalism is high across all demographics in Russia: when asked if 
it is the responsibility of citizens to make their neighborhoods clean and prosperous, more than 
60 percent of respondents disagreed, claiming that instead the state should take responsibility for 
                                                 
28 Kolstø, Pål. 2004. “Nation-Building in Russia: a Value-Oriented Strategy.” in Nation-Building and 
Common Values in Russia, eds. Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield. 9. 




beautification. 52 percent of respondents believed it to be fairly good or good for a state to have 
“a strong leader who does not have to bother with a parliament or elections.” This is contrasted 
in the study with western Germany, in which 10 percent of respondents agreed, and Switzerland, 
in which 30 percent agreed, for a mean of 23 percent in western Europe.30 This suggests that 
Putin is indeed correct about the state-centric mindset being a uniquely Russian value, and also 
connects the state-building process with the nation-building process in Russia in a more cohesive 
way than in most states: as the state improves its ability to keep citizens safe and provide for 
their basic needs, it builds on existing values held by these same citizens. Essentially, Kolstø 
argues that Russian nation-building builds the state in a more closely-linked way than in most 
states. Furthermore, Putin has presided over what Taras Kuzio calls “the militarization of 
Russian society,” reinvigorating Russian support for and identification with the military through 
enormous military parades commemorating events such as the Great Patriotic War or World War 
I and arms demonstrations.31 Support for the military as a binding force in Russian society has 
become important to Putin’s state building project. Kusio identifies this as a trend that has 
developed since Putin’s spell as interim president, but has escalated since his 2012 election 
victory and his turn towards ethnic nationalism, which is discussed in more detail below. 
 While this study covers journalists from three of Putin’s four terms as president, it is 
important to acknowledge a shift in nation-building policy from the state in 2012. Following 
Putin’s announcement that he would run for a third term as president, his approval rating fell 
from above 80 percent to near 60 percent, as the decision sparked large protests in major cities 
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that continued through the election and the inauguration on May 7 2012. Graeme Robertson and 
Samuel Greene argue that Putin was able to recover his lost support and stop protest activity with 
a package of repression, social improvement, and ideological re-positioning that targeted 
minority groups such as atheists, the LGBT community, and non-Russian ethnic migrants.32 
Robertson and Greene also argue that this trend was reinforced by the 2014 EuroMaidan 
revolution in Ukraine and ensuing conflict in Donbas.33 I describe this ideological campaign as a 
partial re-positioning of the nation-building project. While the pre-2012 tenants of great-power-
ism, state-centric-ism, and paternalism remained important after 2012 or even increased in 
importance, the new ideological project added an ethnic element to the nation-building project 
through its demonization of ethnic migrants and newly energized support for the Russian 
Orthodox Church. 
 Worryingly for the Russian state building project, though, has been a pattern of perceived 
weaknesses in the state. Early in the post-Soviet period in Russia the question of the future of the 
Russian state was at the forefront of political and popular debate; newspaper headlines from the 
early 1990s in Russia included “will Russia survive the collapse of an empire?” and “the empire 
has collapsed, who is lying there, trapped under the rubble?34.” There is also evidence that this 
threat began before that state’s collapse: both Russian ethnic nationalists and orthodox 
communists opposed Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika reform package of the 1980s. Kolstø 
claims that this opposition was on the grounds of, for the nationalists, its perceived support of 
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common human values over Russian national values, and for the communists, its support of these 
values over class values.35 Perestroika also was, as mentioned before, famous for its embrace of 
more open reporting and investigative journalism. If the perestroika idea was considered 
dangerous to the building of the Russian state during the end of the Soviet Union, activities 
associated with it could also be construed as dangerous.
                                                 




CHAPTER THREE: CASES 
 In this next section, I present my six cases: four that I believe are in line with my 
expectations for this study, and two outliers that in unique ways challenge my theory of 
journalist violence and state building. Two of the first four are from the 2000-2008 period of 
Putin’s administration while the other two are from the 2012-2024 period, and the two outliers 
are also distributed across the two periods. 
Case One: Anna Politkovskaya 
 Anna Politkovskaya was the 15th journalist to be killed on the territory of the Russian 
Federation since the beginning of the Putin administration.36 She was born in New York in 1958 
to Ukrainian Soviet citizens, and was a holder of both Soviet and American citizenship. Her 
parents were diplomats working with the Soviet Embassy in the United States, but she returned 
to the Soviet Union for her university schooling in the 1970s, receiving a degree in journalism at 
Lomonosov Moscow State University.37 Her husband, Alexander Politkovski, hosted a popular 
television show called Vzglyad, but according to Susan Novak in her paper on Politkovskaya’s 
reporting style, Politkovskaya chose not to use her husband’s connections to pursue journalism at 
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a large firm, instead option to pursue employment at independent media outlets.38 She moved 
between a few different companies before moving to the paper that she is most often associated 
with, Novaya Gazeta, in 1999. This move coincided with the re-commencement of hostilities in 
Chechnya, which would become the Second Chechen War, and Politkovskaya’s first assignment 
was in the Chechen Republic, where she began working on investigating human rights abuses 
and war crimes in the region.39  
Chechnya as a Site of State Building  
 “We are witnessing today the formation of a fundamentalist international,” claimed 
President Putin in a 2000 interview with Paris Match, becoming the first world leader to draw a 
connection between the ongoing Chechen insurgency and other Islamic insurgencies.40 John 
Russel claims that this depiction of a just and successful war was integral to Putin’s public 
relations campaign ahead of the 2000 presidential election. In November of the previous year, he 
“ordered all Russian news media to refer to the Chechen oppositions as ‘terrorists,’” and he made 
increasingly frequent reference to the idea of the “fundamentalist international” as the war 
continued.41 Putin clearly believed that Russian military success (and the depiction of Russian 
military success) in Chechnya was central to his project for Russia: this war against terrorists 
“was the backdrop against which Vladimir Putin handily won the Russian presidency;” Russel 
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goes as far as to claim that “Putin’s rise to power… was linked closely to the hard-line policy 
adopted vis-à-vis the Chechens.”42 The success of the campaign was declared by March of 2000, 
with Putin explaining that Chechen armed formations had been entirely defeated and compared 
Chechen leaders to defeated Nazi war criminals.43 Indeed, political scientist Daniel Triesman 
finds that from 2000 to 2011, there was a statistically significant positive correlation between 
continued military campaigns in Chechnya and public approval for Putin.44 This wartime 
patriotism had become integral to Putin’s popularity by the time of Politkovskaya’s arrival in 
Chechnya. 
Politkovskaya on Chechnya  
 It was in this politically charged environment, during 1999 and the first few years of the 
21st century, that Politkovskaya’s writing began to threaten the active state building process 
taking place in Chechnya during her first dispatches from the region as an employee of Novaya 
Gazeta. She strongly criticized the war as a concept, writing vivid and disturbing scenes of some 
of the everyday violence and atrocities that took place even at the early stages of the war. She 
writes of speaking with children about their hopes for the future days after their parents were 
killed; of their starvation, lack of clothes, and of the violent death of their father during a security 
sweep by federal troops.45 These sorts of images strongly contradicted with the official depiction 
of the war in Chechnya, which was being depicted as a just war against international Islamic 
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terrorism. She also challenged the critical state assertion that the Chechen military was quickly 
and easily defeated; while much of her writing indeed focuses on the insurgency and the army’s 
efforts to eradicate it, she was also writing about the enormous amount of general violence in the 
supposedly military-controlled Chechen cities. These include the security sweeps described 
above, which she describes as a frequent and extremely violent, as well as always perpetrated by 
troops from the federal government. In this way Politkovskaya was one of the few reporters in 
Chechnya dedicated to reporting on crimes committed by the Russian army and federal troops. 
As mentioned before, the official narrative of the government on the conflict was that the war 
was being fought successfully and professionally, and that the army was working to pacify the 
region and keep ordinary Russians safe from terrorist activity such as the Moscow apartment 
bombings of 1999. Politkovskaya’s reporting challenged this idea, and therefore the unity of the 
Russian people in their support for the army, by painting the federal troops as frequent 
perpetrators of illegal violence. She describes the death of a Chechen mother and her infant son 
on 3 January 2000, killed by a tank shell fired from a Russian armored division. Politkovskaya 
concurs with the woman’s sister’s opinion: that the shell was fired randomly by soldiers 
celebrating the new millennium.46 This sort of reportage was inherently dangerous to the 
patriotic narrative created by the Russian state: it confronted Russian citizens with stories of 
atrocities and the more unpleasant aspects of Putin’s war, encouraging them to question the 
righteousness and importance of the patriotic war ostensibly against Islamic extremism. This sort 
of coverage of specific atrocities carried out by the military directly attacked the idea of  
National Tragedies and State Building  
                                                 




 Politkovskaya famously challenged a second state building objective in her coverage of 
two Russian national tragedies: the Nord-Ost theater crisis and the Beslan school siege. She was 
personally involved as a negotiator in both disasters, and once again was critical of the 
government in her coverage of them, both during and after the disasters had taken place. As 
demonstrated by Daniel Treisman in his study on presidential approval ratings in hybrid regimes, 
Chechen extremist violence on Russian soil has been consistently correlated with increased 
approval ratings for military action, and by extension, President Putin himself.47 This was 
especially true for the Nord-Ost crisis: following the hostage-taking in the Dubrovka Theater in 
downtown Moscow in 2002, “support for the military option (usage of force in Chechnya) leapt 
from 34%… to 48%,” which led to a rally behind Putin, the architect of successful military 
action in Chechnya, as his personal approval jumped six points.48 The 2004 Beslan school siege, 
in which 334 were killed before and during the Russian storming of the school, had a similar 
effect: an increase of 7 percentage points for support of military action in Chechnya, though 
Putin’s personal support increased less than would have been suspected, given the data following 
the 2002 theater attack. These sorts of attacks were, by 2006, absolutely essential to the 
maintenance of the President’s support. 
Politkovskaya on Nord-Ost and Beslan  
 Politkovskaya’s reporting on the tragedies focused largely on the Russian government’s 
mishandling of both Nord-Ost and Beslan. Nord-Ost, which she refers to in her book Putin’s 
Russia as “the latest tale of destruction,” was referred to by Putin on the evening of the gas attack 
                                                 






as a victory for Russia “‘over the forces of international terrorism.’”49 Politkovskaya’s coverage 
disagreed: she was one of a handful of reporters who wrote about the Russian military’s role in 
the deaths of hundreds of hostages, including Yaroslav Fadeev, officially the first to be killed 
during the assault, but absent from the list of hostages shot by terrorists, suggesting he was killed 
by the rescuers.50 Politkovskaya was among those who drew a strong link between the gas that 
was deployed in the theater, ostensibly to force the hostage-takers from the building, and the 
deaths of the hostages. In her writing she described in detail the fates of those killed by the gas, 
including the fruitless efforts of their families to sue the government and security services. She 
also describes the opinions of the families of the victims: in contrast with the government’s 
response to the tragedy (additional military action in Chechnya), Politkovskaya related the 
beliefs of Nord-Ost families that Putin should have come a compromise to avoid the deaths of 
the hostages.51 Critically, this reporting challenged the conceptualization of Nord-Ost that had 
been created by the Russian state: that of a rally-point against Islamic extremism in general and 
Chechnya in particular. 
 In Beslan, the situation was similar: while the rally effect was less pronounced than in 
Nord-Ost, it was still present, and Politkovskaya’s reporting focused on contradicting the 
government’s narrative of the tragedy with personal, primary-source reporting. She herself was 
actually incapacitated during the siege: she planned to assist in negotiating as she had done at 
Nord-Ost, but after taking tea on a flight from Rostov she became comatose, an incident 
suspected of being intentional. Her discussion of the siege after she emerged from the coma, 
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though, focused primarily on mishandling on the part of the government, as well as the 
government’s efforts to exploit the tragedy. As early as 1st September, Politkovskaya was 
addressing government misinformation surrounding the total number of hostages trapped: 
initially the government announced that 354 individuals were trapped in the school while the 
number was closer to 1200.52 She also linked the two tragedies through her reporting, describing 
the arrival of the Nord-Ost families to the Beslan site after the Russian military cleared the 
building, and the compassion that these two groups of families had for each other. Finally, she 
explains the efforts of the Russian government to exploit Beslan: accusing the state of 
weaponizing the narrative to suspend trial-by-jury rights as well as justifying continued military 
action in Chechnya. This multi-faceted challenge to the official narrative of the siege, covering 
details as varied as the death toll, the method of attack, and the actions of the hostage-takers, 
served a similar role to her coverage of the Nord-Ost disaster. As the Russian state worked to 
declare victory in the aftermath of the attack and rally the nation around the tragedy, 
Politkovskaya wrote critically of the government’s efforts to rectify the situation in the first 
place.  
 In both of these situations, Politkovskaya also acted in a semi-official role, similarly to 
that of many of the other cases reviewed in this study, giving her prominence and visibility 
beyond that of a journalist. In Nord-Ost, she was directly involved as a hostage negotiator, 
entering the theater to speak with some of the female hostage takers as well as the hostages 
themselves, and working to have food and water brought into the building. She had planned a 
similar role at Beslan, but despite arguing her way onto a plane after authorities tried to prevent 
her from boarding, she never reached the school; as mentioned before, she became gravely ill 
                                                 




during the flight from Moscow. This is consistent with the following case, Yuri Shchekochikhin, 
as well as Dmitry Popkov and Nikolai Andrushchenko, representing 4 of my 6 case studies. 
Case Two: Yuri Shchekochikhin 
 Yuri Shchekochikhin was the eighth journalist to be killed on the territory of the Russian 
Federation since the beginning of the Putin administration.53 He was an atypical journalist in that 
he frequently held political office while employed at (or indeed in charge of) a number of 
newspapers, but was best known for his work with Novaya Gazeta from 1996 until his death in 
2003. Shchekochikhin graduated from Moscow State University (MGU) in 1975, and 
immediately began working full-time at the large circulation paper Komsomolskaya Pravda. It 
was his 1980 move to liberal newspaper Literaturnaya Gazeta, however, that began to establish 
his reputation as an effective and unafraid investigative journalist.54 As mentioned before, the 
late 1980s saw the first real opening of press freedom in the Soviet Union before its collapse in 
1991, and Literaturnaya Gazeta was one of the papers on the cutting edge of the uncovering of 
Soviet state secrets that had become a popular form of journalism by the end of the Soviet 
period. One of Shchekochikhin’s early publications, which propelled him to national fame, was 
an interview with police Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Gurov, who publicly confirmed for the 
first time that a large network of organized crime existed within the Soviet Union.55 In 1990 he 
began his political career, being elected to the Congress of People’s Deputies representing the 
Luhansk Oblast; in 1995 he was elected to the newly-formed Russian State Duma as a 
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representative of the liberal party Yabloko.56 During this decade, however, he did not completely 
cease his activity as a journalist; also in 1995 he tapped into the rapidly growing Russian 
television market with an investigative series called Special Brigade. His series was cancelled 
before the year was out by ORT, the Berezovsky-owned media firm funding it, allegedly for 
overstepping its boundaries in reporting on Russian business interests in the ongoing Chechen 
War. Shchekochikhin also reported on the 2000 sinking of the submarine Kursk, and alleged that 
the slow response time was a result of the government covering up for its inability to rescue the 
crew.57 He was also a member of the Sergei Kovalev Commission, dedicated to investing claims 
that the bombing attacks on apartment blocks in Moscow in 1999 were carried out by state 
security forces.58  
 Arguably his best-known project, written from 2001 to 2003 while Shchekochikhin was 
deputy editor of Novaya Gazeta, was his multi-part series on money laundering and high-level 
corruption through the Moscow furniture store Tri Kita (Three Whales).59 The Three Whales 
affair received national attention and even received a formal response from President Putin: 
Shchekochikhin wrote him personally in March 2002 to request his intervention in the 
investigation.60 Putin responded positively, but by June 2003 had not taken concrete steps to 
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continue the investigation.61 Committee to Protect Journalists describes that on June 17 2003, 
Shchekochikhin fell ill while in Ryazan, returning to Moscow to see a doctor who diagnosed him 
with an acute respiratory infection. His situation deteriorated and he was admitted to a hospital 
on the 21st, where he suffered gradual total organ failure over the next twelve days and died on 3 
July. The investigation into his death was complex: the Prosecutor General’s Office never 
opened an inquiry into his death as they accepted a doctor’s claim that his symptoms were 
consistent with Lyell’s Syndrome, a severe allergic reaction to a medication or an infection, 
despite the allergen or infection never being identified. Shchekochikhin’s medical test results 
that resulted in the original diagnosis of respiratory infection and in his autopsy have been 
formally classified as a “medical secret,” meaning that not even the Prosecutor General’s Office 
has access to them. The office has therefore not found evidence of foul play, and cannot open an 
investigation without this evidence, while the opening of a criminal investigation is the only 
action that could grant prosecutorial access to the medical test results.62 
Shchekochikhin on State Building after the Soviet Union  
 Shchekochikhin’s reporting and public statements challenged the state building effort in 
two primary ways: firstly through his rhetorical linking of the Putin and Yeltsin governments to 
the Soviet Union, and secondly through his critical reporting on Russian state security. In 2003, 
and to a greater degree in the 1990s and first two years of the Putin administration, the Russian 
state building project was beginning to get underway and was at its most vulnerable.63 
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Shchekochikhin’s work, particularly his later work, concentrated on linking the current Russian 
state to the Soviet Union, particularly in the realm of human rights abuses. Shchekochikhin, as a 
journalist at the liberal paper Literaturnaya Gazeta in the perestroika period, was one of many 
journalists working on investigations into Soviet human rights abuses; in 1987, for example, 
under his authority Literaturnaya Gazeta was the first large-circulation paper to publish a letter 
explaining and criticizing the Soviet prison labor system.64 Into the post-communist period he 
was a member of Memorial, a human rights organization dedicated to “preserving the memory of 
the victims of political repressions of totalitarian regimes.”65 His speculation on where the Putin 
administration was headed, then, was particularly critical and damaging for the state’s 
legitimacy. Having already been accused by his former employers of “destabilizing the situation 
in the country,” he accused Putin and his government of “driving [the nation] more incessantly 
back to the radiant past,” and “returning [them] to where [they] have escaped from.”66 On 27 
January 2003, about five months before his death, Shchekochikhin published “Are we Russia - or 
the KGB of the Soviet Union,” covering an attempted kidnapping of a Russian national by 
Turkmen state security forces inside of Russia.67 He refers to an incident in Moscow where 
Kazakh state security attempted to arrest a former minister on the grounds of the airport and how 
he fought against this, but intentionally refers to the Kazakh state security as the “foreign (former 
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Soviet)” security service, asking why they “wander around in Russia as if it is still the USSR.” 
He also describes how his political party Yabloko inquired with Russian state security, who 
responded by asserting that the political situation in Turkmenistan is complex.68 While this 
certainly does not link Shchekochikhin as a campaigner against the rossisskii identity, it rather 
establishes him as a critic of the government’s unification efforts, and a very public one as well. 
Shchekochikhin on State Efficacy  
 Shchekochikhin was perhaps best known for his work on the affairs of Russian state 
security organizations, specifically their alleged legal transgressions and failure to perform their 
duties. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, his most notable work was his investigation into the 
Three Whales corruption scandal from 2001 to his death in 2003. Three Whales, a large Moscow 
furniture store, was identified as being a money laundering site for a number of FSB officials. In 
November 2000 the Prosecutor General’s Office intervened to defend the FSB, confiscating case 
files and charging customs officers in charge of the initial investigation with conducting illegal 
searches, effectively ending the investigation. On 18 February Shchekochikhin wrote an article 
revealing that the Prosecutor General’s Office had been the recipient of 2 million US dollars in 
bribes from security services.69 The next month in his capacity as deputy chairman for the state 
committee on security he began a parliamentary probe, but the Prosecutor General in the case 
refused to reopen it.70 
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 This series of reports, and the accompanying legislative action against the FSB and 
Prosecutor General’s Office, established that state security forces were not only self-interested 
and corrupt, but also connected enough to prevent oversight. Paternalism, the belief that the state 
should take care of citizens’ needs, is a central tenant of the quality of state-centeredness 
(gosudarstvennichestvo) mentioned earlier, and so this two-faceted revelation was particularly 
damaging. Three Whales reporting challenged not only the idea that the Russian state’s security 
forces had reformed following 1991 and were functional enough to concentrate on protecting 
their interests, but also that the state’s oversight organizations such as customs were strong 
enough to effectively limit other state organizations. Using gosudarstvennichestvo as an aspect 
for a redefinition of national character would be understandably difficult if concrete proof 
emerges of the state’s predatory behavior and ability to insulate itself from prosecution; such an 
incident would certainly prove the state’s increased efficacy, but raise questions about its ethics 
and ability to police itself. Furthermore, Shchekochikhin was a veteran of the 1980s media 
period and the relatively free 90s, and his reporting could be considered a continuation of this 
tradition of revealing state improprieties that damaged the Soviet state as it approached its 
collapse. 
Case 3: Maxim Borodin 
 Maxim Borodin was the 29th journalist to be killed on the territory of the Russian 
Federation since the beginning of the Putin administration. He was 32 when he died, younger 
than most of the other cases that this paper covers, and therefore had written less than most of 
these cases. Borodin at the time of his death had worked for almost his entire career in 




usually referred to in English publications.71 The majority of his work before 2017 was based 
around typical happenings in Yekaterinburg, such as local political campaigns,72 preparations for 
the 2018 FIFA World Cup,73 and tax office protests.74 His first high-profile controversial series 
of publications came in the summer of 2017 ahead of the release of the film “Matilda,” a semi-
historical drama covering the affair of the ballerina Matilda Kshesinkaya and Crown Prince 
Nicholas Romanov, before the latter’s marriage and coronation.75 The film was controversial for 
its depiction of the alleged affair in light of Nicholas II’s recent canonization within the Russian 
Orthodox Church, where he is honored as a martyr. Screenings of the film prompted local 
protests in many cities, where citizens brought icons of the late Czar as well as protest signs. 
Borodin covered the efforts of the Yekaterinburg movie theater “Kosmos” to screen the film on 
its release date despite local protests and, most notably, an arson attack that destroyed much of 
the front facade of the theater.76 Critically, he wrote a piece covering a sub-group inside of 
Russian Orthodoxy called the tsarebozhniki, who revere Nicholas II and his family as saints 
                                                 
71 Novy Den’ Information Service. 15 April 2018. “Skonchalsya dzurnalist Maksim Borodin.” Novy Den’. 
https://newdaynews.ru/ekb/633323.html 
72 Borodin, Maxim. 2 February 2018. “V Yekaterinburge snova priletaet Ksenia Sobchak - na etot raz bez 
politicheskoi agitatsii.” Novy Den’. https://newdaynews.ru/ekb/627072.html 
73 Borodin, Maxim. 6 February 2018. “V Yekaterinburge bo vremya ChM-2018 planiruetsya 
predstavietel’stva srazu neskolkikh posol’stv.” Novy Den’. https://newdaynews.ru/ekb/627389.html  
74 Borodin, Maxim, and Aleksandr Salivanchuk. 21 November 2017. “Otdeleniya nalogovoi sluzhbi v 
Yekaterinburge gorozhanye berut shturmom - zima blizko.” Novy Den’. 
https://newdaynews.ru/ekb/620881.html 
75 Kramer, Andrew E. 25 October 2017. “‘Matilda,’ Heretical to Some in Russia, Mostly Elicits Giggles.” 
The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/world/europe/matilda-russia-tsar.html 
76 Borodin, Maksim. 4 September 2017. “V KKT ‘Kosmos’ ne gotovi potverdit’ prokat ‘Matil’di’ posle 





more passionately than most believers, and it was this group that Borodin identified as the 
primary critics of the film and most likely perpetrators of the arson attacks. In October, Borodin 
gave an interview regarding this group and while leaving the interview, he was assaulted with a 
metal pipe, resulting in his hospitalization.77 No one was charged with the assault, which 
Borodin believed to be a result of his reporting but not connected to the government.78 
 Borodin’s most high-profile reporting, which some allege resulted in his murder, covered 
the deaths of two Asbest citizens while working for a Private Military Corporation in Syria, 
fighting on the side of the government against American-backed rebels. The Asbest men were 
employed by Wagner Group, a PMC that has working in Syria from the early days of the civil 
war, and were killed during an airstrike by American military forces working in conjunction with 
Syrian rebels which killed 217 members of the Russian-Syrian coalition.79 Part of this research 
was to uncover the exact number of Russians killed in the attack, which was estimated in the 
dozens. Borodin was the first person to report on the catastrophic attack, and wrote a series of 
articles on the men, their families, and the organization, which had no official presence in Syria. 
He also reported links between the Syrian fighters and fighters in the Donbas region of Ukraine, 
claiming that through his communication with the victims’ families he learned that some had 
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fought in Donbas and were recruited in Syria, while others went from Syria after the attack to 
Donbas with the Wagner Group.80 
 The circumstances of Borodin’s death are uncertain, like that of Shchekochikhin; 
however, it is certain that he died under mysterious and violent circumstances, leaving no 
shortage of theories. A few days before the incident that led to his death, Borodin told his editor-
in-chief that he had noticed that he was being followed on the way to his office and that the 
building was being monitored, but neither of them contacted the police.81 Early in the morning of 
Wednesday, April 11th, Borodin called a close friend, Vyacheslav Bashkov, and told him that 
“he was surrounded by security forces (siloviki), on the balcony was a man with a weapon, and 
on the landing there were people wearing camouflage and masks.”82 According to Bashkov, 
Borodin called back a few hours later, explaining that the presence of the men was due to a 
security exercise, and that he was not in danger. Bashkov reports that Friday morning, he turned 
on the news to find that Borodin was in a coma after falling from his balcony. He died on Sunday 
after failing to regain consciousness. Police told local residents who had come to the building to 
see where Borodin had fallen that the journalist was a drunk who had thrown himself from the 
balcony. “Medical examination refutes this,” claims Novaya Gazeta’s Izol’da Drobina and Pavel 
Gutiontov: no alcohol or narcotics were found in Borodin’s blood after he was found. No suicide 
note was found, and Borodin had recently accepted a job away from Yekaterinburg. No 
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investigators found evidence of wrongdoing, and a number of Borodin’s colleagues and friends 
agree, including Leonid Volkov, a personal friend and director of opposition candidate Alexey 
Navalny’s campaigning efforts.83 OSCE media freedom representative Arlem Dezir joined 
Committee to Protect Journalists in calling for a more thorough investigation, however.84 Despite 
the conflicting opinions I have decided to include this case in my sample due to the uncertain 
nature of the incident, particularly in the presence of security forces near Borodin’s apartment, 
the documented incident of following from days before, and the lack of a suicide note or 
narcotics present in his body. 
Borodin’s Coverage of National Myths 
 Borodin’s first move into international notoriety was for his sensational coverage of the 
film “Matilda,” specifically, his investigative reporting into the tsarebozhniki sect of Russian 
Orthodoxy. Kolstø’s hybrid model of ethnic and civic citizenship, which he identifies as taking 
place in Russia since 1991, is a model for nation-building in which “the state is understood as a 
national but not a nationalizing state,” indicating that while the state has a national character to it, 
it does not go so far as to forcibly assimilate other national groups or infringe on their rights of 
cultural expression.85 The state’s interactions with various sides of the Matilda debate can be put 
into this context as well: while the Putin administration is generally outwardly supportive of 
Orthodoxy, it must maintain a balance between support for the Russian ethnic nationality and 
protection of minority identities. Borodin’s coverage of the defenders of Matilda, then, would 
have been frustrating for those concerned with state and nation-building: he convincingly and 
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indeed accurately portrayed the tsarebozhniki as dangerous radicals working to stop the film’s 
release at any cost, including terrorism. The fact that this sort of attack could occur, and a 
reporter covering it could be assaulted without repercussion, would understandably raise 
questions about the state's ability or willingness to confront Russian ethnic nationalism. This sort 
of an assault on the ethnic national religion, already identified as having a special role in 
Russia’s development by the state, would be difficult to ignore emerging from the city in which 
the arson attack actually happened.  
Borodin’s Coverage of the Military 
 As mentioned before, Borodin was the first reporter to break the story of Russian PMC 
members being killed in airstrikes in Syria. The articles themselves make repeated mention of 
the fact that an American coalition carried out the attacks, and later articles written by Borodin 
covering the attack focus on the repatriation of the remains of the fighters as well as the 
emotional effect on their families.86 Investigating and describing in detail the deaths of these men 
and the difficulties of their return, such as an autopsy being conducted in Saint Petersburg and 
the families’ attempts to have the remains released for burial, display the brutality and difficulty 
of fighting a battle that officially Russia was not involved in. Indeed, official Russia depictions 
of their involvement in Syria are positive: for example, an exposition of captured rebel 
weaponry, including tanks, artillery, and fighter jets, has been touring Russia in the last year, and 
plans for the cache to be transported by train across the country are in place.87 In the state 
building context, though, Borodin is unique: most of his reporting took place after the 2014 
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invasion of Ukraine which is often considered the beginning of Putin’s turn towards more 
Russian ethnic nationalism. His coverage of the Wagner Group accounts for this, though: some 
of the first images of the 2015 Russian military intervention in Syria were of the deployment of 
battlefield alters and churches, and often-spokesperson of the Russian Orthodox Church 
Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin stated after the initial intervention that the invasion could be 
considered “a holy war against terrorism.”88 Such a statement carries at least an expectation of 
success, and to challenge this narrative with such personal, in-depth investigative reporting 
challenges both the idea of Russia’s success in the conflict and the success of the religious aspect 
of the Russian nation. Parallels can be drawn to the reportage of Politkovskaya, who challenged 
not only the idea that Russia’s forces were acting justly, but also that their success in the Second 
Chechen War was assured, damaging the public’s trust in the Russian military in the process. 
Case Four: Nikolai Andrushchenko 
 Nikolai Andrushchenko was the twenty-seventh journalist to be killed on the territory of 
the Russian Federation since the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s presidency. Like a number of 
other journalists reviewed in this study, he took a number of paths before becoming a full-time 
writer: he held two doctorate degrees, one in physics and one in math, from Leningrad State 
University, and spent his Soviet career working in these fields.89 In the early 1990s he 
successfully ran for a city council position in Saint Petersburg; he held this seat for 3 years. Also 
in 1990, Andrushchenko co-founded the small-circulation newspaper Novy Peterburg (New 
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Petersburg) with Alevtina Ageyeva, who continues to work with the paper and described 
Andrushchenko as “a constant irritant for the authorities” after his death.90 Andrushchenko 
focused his work in two primary areas: investigative reporting into local government and police 
corruption, and editorials focusing on and nationalism, generally critical of post-Soviet Russian 
governments. These topics, particularly his anti-corruption reporting, made him a target for 
harassment and attack during his career. This history is seen in a number of Russian journalists 
who are murdered for work-related motives, but Andrushchenko was particularly at-risk: in 2007 
he was beaten weeks before Saint Petersburg police conducted a raid of Novy Peterburg’s office 
and jailed him for his reporting on the murder of a Congolese exchange student.91 2007 was a 
difficult year for both Andrushchenko and his paper, as in addition to the filing of charges and 
the November 9 physical assault (which was never fully investigated), a series of strange attacks 
began. These included an anonymous individual buying an entire print run of the paper on 
November 15 as a story critical of the chief of police was published and the largest publishing 
house in Saint Petersburg refusing to print the paper a week later, citing overload.92 
Andrushchenko was imprisoned for 2 months as “pre-trial detention” but was acquitted 
following the conclusion of the trial.93 The next year, however, a separate court found him guilty 
of “insulting a government official in connection with the execution of his official duties” and he 
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was given a substantial fine of 20,000 rubles.94 In 2016, while working on an anti-corruption 
investigation, Andrushchenko was beaten again, in an attack his colleague describes as an 
attempted murder, as it was only stopped when neighbors arrived and chased away the 
assailants.95 
 On March 9 2017 Andrushchenko was assaulted outside of his home by people 
demanding documents related to stories he was working on.96 He was placed in a medically-
induced coma upon arrival, from which he never emerged, dying on 19 April. Novy Peterburg’s 
staff claim that the police only contacted them once, while opening a preliminary probe into the 
initial beating, and no suspects have ever been named in the case.97 
Andrushchenko, Nostalgia, and Nationalism 
 As mentioned before, Andrushchenko’s investigative reporting focused on uncovering 
corruption as was typical for journalists who were active during the 1980s and 1990s; however, 
he is an outlier in this research because of his frequent editorials and their content. While anti-
corruption investigations are frequently observed among journalists who are victims of violence, 
most of them (and indeed all of the other cases reviewed here) are considered liberals. 
Andrushchenko’s paper Novy Peterburg today writes frequently about Stalinism, claiming to 
fight off the government forces and anarchists trying to claim his image, recognizing his 
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“popularity with the people.”98 This approach to Stalin, claiming his memory against the state’s 
attempts to do the same, is particularly interesting given the date of publication and indeed the 
time of Andrushchenko’s murder. As mentioned before, Putin has turned towards more of an 
ethnic model of nation building since the beginning of his third term in 2012, but an element of 
this turn has been the rehabilitation of Russian authoritarian leaders, perhaps chiefly among them 
Stalin. Taras Kuzio claims in his paper on post-2012 Russian national identity that for the 
Russian state, veneration of Stalin is part of the “cult of the Great Patriotic War” with Stalin’s 
atrocities ignored due to his efforts to win the war.99 As Putin moves more towards an ethnic 
nationalist policy towards nation-building, creating an uncontested ownership of the symbols and 
heroes of the Russian national story could be imperative, and those nationalists that resist such an 
ownership could endanger the program. 
 Andrushchenko, like most of these cases, also held a non-journalist official position as a 
member of the Saint Petersburg City Council.  
Case Five: Dmitry Popkov 
 Dmitry Popkov was the twenty-eighth journalist to have been killed on the territory of the 
Russian Federation since the beginning of the Putin administration. Like many of the journalists 
covered in this study, he was originally involved in politics, serving on the Minusinsk City 
                                                 
98 Metelitsa, Ivan. 27 February 2019. “Stalina ‘prikhvatizirovat’’ ne udastsya!” Novy Peterburg. Retrieved 
from http://newspb.su/bez/stalina-prihvatizirovat-ne-udastsya/ 
99 Kuzio, Taras. 7 January 2016. “Nationalism and authoritarianism in Russia: Introduction to the special 





Council until 2013 as a representative of the Communist Party.100 In 2013 however he was 
accused of beating a disabled youth during Minusinsk City Day celebrations and was removed 
from the council, at which point he founded the newspaper Ton-M where he would spend the 
remainder of his life.101 Novaya Gazeta also covered this 2013 incident, and allege that the boy 
involved was a diabetic whose insulin pump broke after he was attacked by an unidentified man. 
Popkov was arrested and charged with the attack, and while he was not convicted of a crime, he 
was removed from the city council despite one Andrei Kozhukovsky coming forward and 
claiming that he was the only man involved in the altercation.102 Later that year he founded Ton-
M, with the motto “We write what others stay silent about,” focusing on investigating local 
government and police corruption but also daily events, holidays, and other happenings in 
Minusinsk.103 Ton-M’s subscribers and Minusinsk residents claim that the newspaper’s start was 
difficult: they were accustomed to random police searches, death threats, and interrogations, 
allegedly over the content of the investigations that the paper undertook under Popkov’s 
direction.104 By 2017, Ton-M was well-known in Minusinsk and the Krasnoyarsk region as a 
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source for information on investigations into local government officials, the police, and the 
United Russia party.105 
 On 24 May 2017, Popkov’s body was found in a bathhouse near his home in Minusinsk, 
the victim of a shooting. According to Komsomolskaya Pravda, investigating the killing due to 
Popkov’s association with the Communist Party, he had published information in the weeks 
before the murder concerning a criminal investigation into the head of the neighboring 
Kransnoturansk district, as well as new information regarding a former city education head’s 
corruption case, which Popkov initially uncovered, leading to a trial.106 On the 25th, the 
Investigative Commission of Krasnoyarsk Krai opened an investigation into the murder, which 
remains open and has never identified a suspect.107 Ton-M continued to publish both a printed 
edition and on its website following the death of its founder, but discontinued their print edition 
later that year.108 
Popkov’s Investigations and Local Status 
 Popkov fits into the framework established by other cases examined thus far in his anti-
corruption investigator and previous status as an elected official. His transition from city council 
member to newspaper editor was immediate, and would have gained the attention of local 
officials he had previously worked with, especially given the local notoriety that Ton-M 
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obtained. The very public investigations into Minusinsk’s former head of education and into 
other local officials would also have interfered in the local power vertical, even more so if 
Popkov was indeed planning on running for city council once again, as alleged by one of his co-
workers in Komsomolskaya Pravda.109 This would have created a situation similar to that of 
Shchekochikhin, in which an investigative journalist was able to combine the posts of journalist 
and state official, gaining a legitimacy and investigative authority that most journalists lack. 
Case Six: Igor Domnikov 
 Igor Domnikov was the third journalist to be killed on the territory of the Russian 
Federation since the beginning of Putin’s presidency. He spent the majority of career in Lipetsk, 
working as a special topics correspondent for Novaya Gazeta, the newspaper which also 
employed Yuri Shchekochikhin and Anna Politkovskaya.110 Unlike most journalists covered in 
this paper, however, he was professionally trained as a journalists, having attended Tomsk State 
University and receiving a degree in journalism. Upon graduation he began working as a reporter 
in Norilsk, where he stayed for ten years before moving to Zapolyarny. In 1995 he left local 
paper Zapolyarnaya Pravda to start his own local publication, “69 Degrees,” where he served as 
chief editor until he moved to Moscow and took a position with Novaya Gazeta in 1998.111 
Taimskii Telegraph reports that Domnikov experienced his first significant opposition while 
leading 69 Degrees; described as a series of threats and run-ins with Zapolyarny mayor Vasily 
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Tkachev. When employed at Novaya Gazeta, his articles focused mostly on the Lipetsk region, 
between Moscow and Voronezh; his coworker Vyacheslav Izmailov describes his writing as 
“moral essays,” largely written in a very literary style, featuring long digressions and 
metaphors.112 This reporting had a more particular focus as well: former Lipetsk Oblast’ 
governor Sergei Dorovsky. Domnikov wrote a series of essays from May 1999 to February 2000 
that covered financial and moral impropriety on the part of Dorovsky, starting in 1999 with an 
investigation into the former governor’s economic policies that had, according to Domnikov, 
seriously damaged the region.113 Domnikov claimed in other articles that Dorovsky had taken 
bribes, paid himself directly from local tax funds, and arranged for new houses for himself and 
his associates to be built with tax proceeds, even that a deputy of the governor had killed two 
women with a car and had not been prosecuted due to Dorovsky’s protection.114  
 In May 2000 Domnikov was attacked near his home by five unidentified men with 
hammers, and was found unconscious by a neighbor. He was placed into a medical coma, but 
failed to emerge from it and died in July, two months later.115 Unusually for Russian journalists, 
and for Novaya Gazeta employees in particular, Domnikov’s killers were found and charged: in 
2007 a court in Tatarstan convicted five gang members, as part of a larger trial of 16 gang 
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members, of Domnikov’s murder.116 Even more unusually, the investigation continued into those 
who ordered the murder, and in May 2013 the alleged director of the murder Pavel Sopot, a 
business associate and friend of Sergei Dorovsky, was convicted of intentional infliction of a 
grave injury and imprisoned.117 Charges against Dorovsky himself were filed in March 2015, but 
the “alleged mastermind” was not convicted as the statute of limitations had expired.118  
Domnikov’s Place in this Study 
 While Domnikov’s writings are atypical of at-risk investigative journalists like the ones 
covered here, I still consider him to be attacking the Russian state building project and power 
vertical, and therefore at risk of violence.. As mentioned above, Domnikov’s case is unusual in 
two ways: firstly, the scope of his reporting was almost entirely local. During his time at Novaya 
Gazeta, a newspaper based in Moscow but with a national scope, he continued to focus on local 
events. These included a six-part series of articles covering the condition of a giraffe at the 
Moscow zoo named Samson,119 the financial collapse of a sausage factory,120 and the 
aforementioned articles covering Dorovsky, as well as additional articles related to corruption in 
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the Lipetsk region.121 His discussion of situations at the national level tended to discuss 
economics, often in context of the Lipetsk region, or the sort of “moral essays” as described by a 
coworker, such as one covering the period from Gorbachev to Yeltsin and the latter’s feminine 
characteristics.122 Critically though, much of Domnikov’s Lipetsk reporting focused on the 
career and policies of Sergei Dorovsky, as mentioned before. Similar to the case of Dmitry 
Popkov, this sort of consistent, noticeable attack on the local power structure would almost 
certainly elicit a response. This is also the only case in this study in which we can definitively 
name a killer and mastermind, as Domnikov’s killers served time in jail and Dorovsky himself  
 A significant difference between Domnikov’s case and that of the other cases in this 
study is its outcome. Within seven years of the murder, five men were incarcerated on charges of 
murdering the journalist in 2000, and six years after that an alleged planner was convicted for his 
role in the murder. While Dorovsky, the mastermind of the killing, was never convicted due to 
the statute of limitations expiring, it is extraordinary that an investigation into his role in the 
murder took place, and even more so that he was named as a suspect and charged with the crime. 
While this appears to interfere with my arguments regarding impunity for murderers of 
oppositional journalists, I contend that instead it fits within my framework: Domnikov was not a 
significant threat to the state building project in Moscow, Lipetsk, or indeed all of Russia, and 
therefore his killers would not be able to obtain the sort of impunity that the killers of more 
threatening journalists would. He focused almost entirely on local stories, specifically 
government corruption, and unlike many of the cases covered here he had not served in 
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government or in a public non-journalistic role before. His scope was relatively small when 
compared to Politkovskaya or Borodin, who covered national issues. With these qualifications, 
the police and state legal bodies functioned as expected, carried out an investigation into his 





Limits of this Study 
 As mentioned before, using case studies as a methodology in this study has limits; 
namely, it prevents a large sample size from being used and employing quantitative methods to 
describe this data. The topic of the study, however, has encouraged more qualitative methods to 
be used. With 58 cases of journalist murder for reasons likely related to their work since 1992, 
Russia is one of the most violent states on the planet for journalists to operate in, but 58 out of 
many hundreds of investigative journalists in Russia still makes for a relatively small number. 
Because of this, this study has not been able to establish an “iron law” of journalist violence: it 
does not claim to explain every incident of attacks on journalists, but rather identifies two key 
trends: journalists who threaten the development of the Russian state and who have their 
notoriety boosted by serving in an official role outside of journalism are at risk for violent attacks 
with impunity for their killers. Other journalists who attack the state building project and are not 
attacked certainly exist, as evidenced by the continued existence of Novaya Gazeta, Meduza, and 
other critical papers and websites, and for some murdered journalists it is undoubtably difficult 
to link their reportage with attacks on the state building project. However, this study is confident 
in stating that these characteristics can lead to unpunished violence against journalists in Russia. 
 Russia enters 2019 in an unenviable position: placed critically low on measures of 
democracy, freedom of speech, freedom of press, and successful criminal cases carried out 
against those who attack journalists. “Total impunity” is a common measure of prosecutorial 




this study it appears four times out of a possible six. 2019 also sees Russia enter the second year 
of the fourth term of President Putin’s administration, with bills giving Roskomnadzor the 
authority to jail those who publish “fake news” as defined by the government and impose fines 
of up to 300,000 roubles for insulting public servants or state symbols becoming law.123 As Putin 
continues in potentially his final term as president and anti-“fake news” laws become more 
popular worldwide, the Russian state appears to be poised to restrict the publishing and printing 
of opposition materials even more intensely than before. Russia’s new era, both post-Crimea and 
post-2018, will almost certainly continue the existing restructuring patterns observed in state-
media relations since 2000. Will violence continue to decrease as the state continues to 
consolidate media sources under existing state media corporations? Careful and methodical 
observation will be required to analyze the final five years of Putin regarding many 
developments in the Russian state, but a critical area to monitor has been and will continue to be 
the health and safety of opposition media activity under Russia’s longest-serving president. 
Working to monitor threats against journalists serves the memory of the men and women 
discussed here, and the safety of all Russians who work for a free and independent press, 
“fanatically dedicated to this profession of reporting the world around us.”124 
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